

**IN THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS
REGARDING EFFORTS OR ATTEMPTS HAVING BEEN MADE TO STOP
THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION CASES**

HELD AT NEWTOWN JOHANNESBURG

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SISI KHAMPEPE (CHAIRPERSON)

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE FRANS DIALE KGOMO

ADVOCATE ANDREA A GABRIEL SC

INDEX TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF SHADRACK KABELO GANDA

	Description	Pages
1.	Affidavit of Shadrack Kabelo Ganda	1-10
2.	SG1 Gqabi's family letter to NPA	11-13
3.	SG2 Response letter from the NPA	14
4.	SG3 WhatsApp communication with the investigating officer confirming the DPCI's engagement with the State Security Agency.	15

5.	SG4 WhatsApp communication with investigating officer confirming the DPCI's engagement with the Zimbabwean authorities.	16
6.	SG5 WhatsApp communication with the investigating officer confirming the DPCI's attempts to set up a meeting with the State Security Agency.	17
7.	SG6 documents from a book by Kevin Woods	18-26
8.	SG7 List of names of the South African Special Forces members involved in the project "Barnacle and Mixer."	27
9.	SG8 Email containing the EWN: Eyewitness news link shared with the investigating officer regarding the Imam Haron Inquest.	28
10.	SG9 WhatsApp communication with the investigating officer where a link to the Imam Haron Inquest was shared.	29
11.	SG10 WhatsApp communication with the investigating officer where a link to the <i>Mail & Guardian</i> article on the apartheid-era military intelligence unit, the Directorate of Covert Collection, was shared.	30
12.	SG11 Calendar invite	31

IN THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS
REGARDING EFFORTS OR ATTEMPTS HAVING BEEN MADE TO STOP
THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION CASES

HELD AT NEWTOWN, JOHANNESBURG

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SISI KHAMPEPE (CHAIRPERSON)

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE FRANS DIALE KGOMO

ADVOCATE ANDREA GABRIEL SC

AFFIDAVIT OF SHADRACK KABELO GANDA

THE DEPONENT

I, the undersigned,

SHADRACK KABELO GANDA

do state under oath that:

1. I am an adult male, currently residing in Sydney, Australia.
2. I was a close friend and comrade of Joe Nzingo Gqabi, who was assassinated by agents of the apartheid government on 31 July 1981 in Harare, Zimbabwe. I am also a

SG, 1

SS

victim of apartheid-era political violence.

3. I depose to this affidavit on behalf of the late Mrs. Aurelia Nomazotsho Gqabi, the widow of Joe Nzingo Gqabi, and in my own capacity as a co-complainant, given that the same apartheid-era South African security agents endangered my life.
4. The late Mrs. Gqabi was the last surviving immediate member of her family, as all her children had predeceased her, and I am now tasked with continuing the pursuit of justice until the truth is revealed.
5. The facts deposed to in this affidavit are, unless I indicate otherwise, within my own personal knowledge, true and correct.

PURPOSE OF THIS AFFIDAVIT

6. The purpose of this affidavit is to formally request participation as an interested party in the Commission of Inquiry into allegations regarding efforts or attempts to stop the investigation or prosecution of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Cases (the Commission).
7. I respectfully seek to testify and to place evidence before the Commission regarding:
 - a. The failure of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to properly investigate the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Joe Nzingo Gqabi, and to hold those responsible accountable.
 - b. The failure of the NPA to follow up on the credible leads provided by the family, which could have assisted in identifying those responsible for the assassination of Joe Nzingo Gqabi.
8. My evidence is material to the Commission's mandate because:

8.1 I personally engaged and followed up with the NPA to open investigations into the

SG 2
SS

assassination of Joe Gqabi. I have also documented the Gqabi family's struggle for justice, including email correspondence between the family and the NPA relating to the investigations, as well as meetings held at NPA offices in Pretoria and at Mrs Gqabi's residence.

8.2 I am a direct victim of the apartheid-era political violence, and I also testified at the TRC hearings on 25 July 1996.

8.3 My life was endangered in both the initial, unsuccessful bombing of the ANC vehicle used by Joe Gqabi as the sole transport mode available to us and the subsequent attack at our place of residence in Harare, where he was subsequently killed.

BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

9. Joe Nzingo Gqabi, an African National Congress (ANC) member, was assassinated by apartheid agents on 31 July 1981 at his residence at 19 Eves Crescent, Ashdown Park, Harare, Zimbabwe. His life had been under threat for some time. He was killed in a hail of bullets as he was reversing out of his driveway.

10. In the period leading up to his assassination, Joe Gqabi faced several attempts on his life, including on 2 February 1981 when a bomb planted on his vehicle was discovered before it detonated.

11. I am the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) operative who discovered the explosives before they could detonate. At the time, I was living with Joe Gqabi in the same house and worked in the ANC Chief Representative's office, serving as his aide.

12. Had I not uncovered the planted bomb, I would also have been killed, together with whoever was in or near the vehicle. Similarly, on the day of his assassination, had it not been for the fact that I was driving a different (borrowed) car that evening, I too may have been killed by the apartheid government agents.



13. Some of the agents responsible were later arrested and confessed to the Zimbabwean Police, while others remained at large. The court in Zimbabwe freed the accused agent after they claimed that their confessions were made under duress and could not be admitted. Despite these arrests and confessions, the investigations did not progress and were never concluded, and, apart from the arrested agents, no further leads were ever followed up on. To date, no one has been brought to justice.
14. On 25 July 1996, I, together with the late Mrs. Gqabi, widow of Joe Gqabi, testified at the TRC hearings in support of statements we had submitted earlier. The purpose of our testimonies was to request that the TRC investigate all circumstances and actions carried out by the apartheid government, through its agents, in the assassination of Joe Gqabi.
15. Years passed after the TRC hearings, and despite the fact that the TRC had indicated that the matters would be handed over to the NPA for investigation, no investigations were carried out.

INTERFERENCE WITH THE NPA'S INVESTIGATION OF JOE GQABI'S ASSASSINATION

16. The Gqabi family decided to engage the NPA to formally request investigations into this matter, and on 10 October 2020, the late Mrs. Gqabi and I addressed a letter to Advocate Shamila Batohi, the National Director of Public Prosecutions of South Africa, formally requesting that investigations be instituted into the assassination of Joe Gqabi. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG1**, a copy of the above-mentioned letter.
17. The letter expressed concern over the delays in the administration of justice, drawing attention to how the passage of time could reduce the likelihood of successful investigations, as both the perpetrators and those with crucial information could pass away with advancing age. At the time the letter was addressed to the NPA, the late

SL

Mrs. Gqabi was in her eighties, and she subsequently passed away while still awaiting justice.

18. On 13 November 2020, we received a response from the NPA's Advocate Macadam, the Acting Special Director of Public Prosecutions: Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) (see attached annexure marked as **SG2**). Advocate Macadam confirmed that an enquiry had been registered with the DPCI and that Captain Mathipa had been appointed as the Investigating Officer.
19. Advocate Macadam further noted that he had suggested to his team that contact be made with the authorities in Zimbabwe to establish whether they were willing to share any information with the DPCI regarding this matter.
20. After the investigations were instituted, Captain Mathipa subsequently passed away and was succeeded by Captain Sewele, who reports to Colonel Pitsoane. These are the most recent personnel with whom we have interacted from the DPCI.
21. I can confirm that, since 2020, there has been no meaningful progress in the investigations, and the explanations provided to the family have been unsatisfactory. Set out below are some of the reasons provided to the family during the various follow-up engagements we have had with the investigating officer:
 - 21.1 On 23 May 2023, during one of several follow-up engagements with the DPCI, the investigating officer informed the Gqabi family that their investigative efforts were frustrated by the State Security Agency (SSA), which denied them access to the declassified archives of the country's intelligence services. This issue persisted over an extended period; on several occasions, we were told that a letter was sitting on the desk of an official, awaiting their signature. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG3** copy of WhatsApp communication with the investigating officer, Captain Sewele, confirming the above.

SLG
5

SS

- 21.2 On 5 October 2023, the investigating officer informed the family that a meeting had been scheduled between the DPCI and the Director-General of the SSA. He further indicated that he had met with the SSA liaison officer, Mr. Jabulani Radebe, who would engage the Director-General regarding the proposed meeting. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG4** copy of WhatsApp communication with Captain Sewela confirming the above.
- 21.3 On 11 July 2024, the investigating officer informed the family that their investigative efforts were further frustrated by the refusal of the DPCI to approve their travel to Zimbabwe to carry out the investigation. He explained that the relevant authorities within the DPCI had declined the request for such travel.
- 21.4 With the possibility of travelling to Zimbabwe no longer feasible, the investigating officer informed the family that they had attempted to contact the Zimbabwean authorities to request information relating to the case. However, they were advised to channel their request through the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and were therefore awaiting feedback from DIRCO. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG5** copy of WhatsApp communication confirming the above conversation with Captain Sewele.
22. The explanations provided for the lack of progress in this case over the years appear to include systematic pushbacks and a lack of interest in the investigation and prosecution of TRC cases, as evidenced by the failure to pursue any of the leads provided. To the family's knowledge, none of the officers who served in the intelligence apparatus of the apartheid regime, and who were still alive when the investigations commenced, were interviewed, despite the relevant leads having been furnished.
23. The investigating officer failed to act proactively in advancing the investigation. On behalf of the family, I was compelled to repeatedly request feedback and to furnish leads that could help with the investigation. For instance, there are individuals in Harare, Zimbabwe, who could assist with the investigations, such as Mr. Jeremy Brickhill, a survivor of an attempted assassination by car bomb carried out by apartheid

SL, 6

SS

state agents. These individuals may be valuable resources for the investigation; yet, to our knowledge, they were never interviewed. My concern is that many of these potential leads may pass away without critical information being obtained. For instance, Mr Brickhill is now severely disabled as a result of the car bomb he survived.

24. Further leads provided to the investigating officer Mr. Sewela includes:

24.1 A document downloaded from the internet from a book by Kevin Woods, which details some of the atrocities committed by the agents of the apartheid government and specifically mentions the assassination of Joe Gqabi. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG6**, a copy of the document referred to above.

24.2 A list of the names of South African Special Forces members involved in the projects "Barnacle" and "Mixer," which were responsible for tracking and killing MK members outside the borders of South Africa between 1980 and 1993. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG7**, a copy of the list in question.

24.3 An *EWN Eyewitness News* article on the Imam Haron Inquest. I shared the link with investigating officer Captain Sewele to highlight the similarities between the two matters and to suggest that reaching out to the journalist who reported on the Imam Haron Inquest could provide valuable leads for this case. The investigating officer even confirmed that they would contact the journalist; however, to my knowledge, this was never done, and the lead does not appear to have been followed. Please find attached and marked as annexures **SG8** and **SG9** copies of the email and WhatsApp conversation in which the link in question was shared with Captain Sewele.

24.4 A *Mail & Guardian* article concerning the apartheid-era military intelligence unit, the Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC), which names several operatives, including Colins Evans, as involved in covert intelligence activities during that period. Captain Sewele confirmed that he received this lead; however, there is no

SG 7
SS

indication that the lead was ever considered or investigated. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG10** a copy of the WhatsApp conversation with Captain Sewele.

25. A further matter of concern is that some of the perpetrators and accomplices could die before being held accountable due to advancing age or natural causes. For instance, one such perpetrator, a double agent who worked within the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in Zimbabwe, Mr. Verkesser, died in South Africa. While another, Mr. Colin Evans, a British national who worked within the CIO for the South African government, was deported to England following the unsuccessful prosecution of their unit, referenced in the paragraph above, by the Zimbabwean government.

26. During this period of repeated delays and excuses, Mrs. Gqabi's health deteriorated to the point that she lost her ability to move independently. Around that time, suspicions arose that certain parties within the NPA were deliberately seeking to block, derail, or frustrate the investigation. I suspect that these parties were hoping that the late Mrs. Gqabi would soon pass away, which would effectively bring an end to the matter.

27. I recall the meeting held at the late Mrs. Gqabi's residence in Protea Glen on 26 January 2024, attended by both Colone Pitsoane and Captain Sewele. This meeting was prompted by the family's frustration over the lack of progress in the investigations and their suspicion that the NPA was deliberately delaying action, seemingly waiting for Mrs. Gqabi to pass away. This was the last meeting held while the late Mrs. Gqabi was still alive. Please find attached and marked as annexure **SG11**, a picture of the calendar invite.

28. Upon the passing away of Mrs. Gqabi, I telephoned Captain Sewele to inform him of the sad news. He did not appear to be fazed by the news. That was the last communication I had with the investigating team. We have not heard from them since my call to them.

SG,

29. The suspicion that there could have been deliberate and concerted attempts to obstruct and interfere with the investigations into Joe Gqabi's assassination is reinforced by the fact that he was the highest-ranking ANC executive ever assassinated in exile. The order to kill him would necessarily have originated from the highest authorities of the apartheid state, and the disclosure of those responsible would be deeply embarrassing and politically sensitive.

30. Furthermore, the fact that several highly prominent individuals who could have been interviewed by the DPCI remain alive further reinforces the suspicion that the investigations have been deliberately obstructed. The leads exist; it is merely a lack of will to pursue them. I am prepared to disclose their names, some of whom are based abroad.

CONCLUSION

31. I submit that my evidence on behalf of the Gqabi family will demonstrate that there were deliberate efforts to obstruct the investigations and prosecutions of TRC cases, in particular, the assassination of Joe Gqabi, and will assist the Commission in carrying out its mandate.

32. I respectfully submit that the Commission recommend steps to be taken by the NPA, or any other relevant organs of state, to assist with the investigation into his assassination, including, where necessary, access to sealed or archival material relevant to this case. The murder of Joe Gqabi was not an isolated act, it formed part of a widespread and systematic attack carried out against opponents of apartheid that was a crime against humanity. The relevant organs of state are obliged in terms of both the Constitution and international law to investigate his assassination and, insofar as it is possible, ensure accountability and redress.

33. I further respectfully submit that the Commission recommend that constitutional damages be provided to the families and victims of apartheid-era political violence and

Sh,

the gross human rights violations they suffered, including the ongoing violation of their right to human dignity caused by interference with, and failures by, the NPA and South African Police Services in investigating and prosecuting TRC cases.



SHADRACK KABELO GANDA

I hereby certify that the deponent knows and understands the contents of this affidavit and that it is to the best of the deponent's knowledge both true and correct. This affidavit was signed and sworn to before me at _____ on this the ____ day of _____ 2026, and that the Regulations contained in Government Notice R.1258 of 21 July 1972, as amended by R1648 of 19 August 1977, and as further amended by R1428 of 11 July 1989, having been complied with.



COMMISSIONER OF OATHS

Full names: Stephen Smith.
Address: 273 Pacific Highway,
North Sydney NSW.
Capacity: Police Officer.



10

Senior Constable
Stephen Smith
S. Smith
46813
16/2/2026

SS
S.S.

3344 Cape Vulture street,
Protea Glen
Soweto 2000
Gauteng Province

The National Director of Public Prosecutions
Advocate Shamila Batohi
VGM Building, 123 Westlake Avenue
Pretoria

Dear Advocate Shamila Batohi,

Request for investigation into the assassination of Mr. Joe Ndzingo Gqabi

1. Executive Summary
 - 1.1. In 1979, my husband, Mr. Joe Nzingo Gqabi, an ANC member was acquitted of terrorism charges in the Pretoria Twelve Trial. Unhappy with his acquittal, apartheid security forces, sort to pursue extra judiciary methods to silence him. He had to flee to exile.
 - 1.2. He was stationed in Gaborone for a while, after leaving the country, I joined him shortly thereafter. He was subsequently advised that the Botswana Intelligence Officials had communication that South African apartheid agents were plotting to kill him. The Botswana government could not guarantee his safety and was advised to relocate to another country.
 - 1.3. In 1980, he was the ANC Chief Representative in Zimbabwe where his life continued to be under threat by apartheid agents who operating inside and outside Zimbabwe.
 - 1.4. On 02 February 1981, a car bomb was planted on his vehicle, but was foiled by an ANC operative who uncovered it before detonation. Investigation of circumstances surrounding this incident were not completed and those responsible, including their networks were never brought to justice.
 - 1.5. Ultimately on the evening of 31 July 1981, apartheid government agents and its networks managed to assassinate him at his residence, 19 Eves Crescent, Ashdown Park in Harare. Some of the agents involved were later apprehended. Some remained at large and accessory information on them and their handlers was never followed up till present day. He was given an official funeral by the Zimbabwean government in August 1981 and buried in Harare. The investigation that was conducted was not concluded as, apart from the unearthed apartheid agents who confessed to Zimbabwean police, further leads remain unfollowed and not investigated. No one to

date has been brought to justice despite information still available to family and friends who are still alive.

- 1.6. His remains were repatriated to South Africa in 2004 and reburied in Alwal North, in the Eastern Cape Province, on 16 December 2004.
- 1.7. On 25 July 1996, the TRC heard testimony from the family and his ANC comrade, requested an investigation into his assassination. Regrettably, nobody applied to the TRC for amnesty for the conspiracy to or his murder or ever came forward to tell the truth.
- 1.8. We have waited too long for the long arm of the law and the wheels of justice to take their course. Those who committed the offence and those who have information that can provide clues for a successful investigation are ageing and the risk of them passing on is high. It is a race against time to commence the investigation. I am also an octogenarian widow and reside in Johannesburg.

2. What is it that this correspondence seeks to achieve?

- 2.1. This correspondence is an official request by myself done on behalf of the family, relatives and friends to the Office of National Public Prosecution Authority to investigate the circumstances surrounding the assassination of my husband, Mr. Joe Gqabi with the aim of bringing to justice those who,
 - a. ordered and those who carried out the assassination;
 - b. were in the apartheid machinery networks who provided support and helped in carrying out the assassination;
 - c. colluded in defeating the ends of justice and failing to use the TRC to come forward and truthfully disclose what happened to assist the family find closure to be able to move on with life.

3. Recommendations

- 3.1. An investigation by the NPA is requested that will amongst others deal with matters stated under paragraph 2.1 above.
- 3.2. Wherever practical and possible, it is humbly recommended that investigators with a legacy of apartheid or homeland security forces not be involved in this investigation. This in no way prescribes how the NPA should do its work but because the family suffered in the hands of apartheid security forces and its Bantustan forces, it will be rubbing salt into its wounds if the same officers investigate their former colleagues.
- 3.3. In taking this matter forward, kindly contact me at 071 799 4525 or family friend and Joe's close comrade who saw him last before the gruesome murder took place, Mr Shadrack Ganda, on 082 900 1526 who has been assisting me on this matter.

4. I look forward to meaningful engagement with you and ready and willing to assist with all and any information that myself and Mr Ganda were exposed to.

Yours faithfully.

M. Gqabi 10/10/2020
Mrs A N Gqabi.

[Signature] 10/10/2020
Mr S Ganda.

SS

Priority Crimes Litigation Unit



The National Prosecuting Authority
South Africa

SG2

13 November 2020

Mrs AN Gqabi & Mr S Ganda
3344 Cape Vulture Street
Protea Glen
SOWETO
2000

Dear Mrs Gqabi & Mr Ganda

DECEASED: JOE NDZINGO GQABI
CATS ENQUIRY 04/11/2020
INVESTIGATING OFFICER: CAPT F MATHIPA

1. Herewith I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 10 October 2020.
2. The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) has already, at my request, registered an enquiry into Mr Gqabi's death and appointed an investigator. I have also suggested that contact should be made with the Zimbabwean authorities to establish whether they have any information they are willing to share with the DPCI.
3. Captain Mathipa has been appointed as the investigating officer and has already contacted you. He will serve as your point of contact and will keep you informed of further developments until more information is obtained so as to justify referral to a Director of Public Prosecutions.

Kind regards

ADV R. C. MACADAM
ACTING SPECIAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS:
PRIORITY CRIMES LITIGATION UNIT (PCLU)

Postal address: Private Bag X752, Pretoria, 0001, South Africa

Physical address: VGM Building (c/o Westlake Avenue & Hartley Street),

123 Westlake Avenue, Weavind Park, Silverton, Pretoria, 0184, South Africa

Tel: +27 12 845 6000 / 6431 Cell: 082 498 6033 Fax: +27 12 845 6686 Email: cmacadam@npa.gov.za

SS 1.

23:35



95%

< 54



Cpt Sewel...



01:40 ✓✓

20 May 2023

Thanks for the information. I really appreciate it. I have requested Luthuli House to push DG State Security Agency to provide our office with the files. I am not happy the manner in which Advocate Masilela deals with this matter because he is not even taking my calls. I will keep you informed.

01:53

This message was deleted.

01:55

This message was deleted.

01:56

24 Jun 2023

You deleted this message.



gl,
SS

< 47



Cpt Sewel...



05 Oct 2023
Good evening Cpt Sewele
I trust you are well.

How did you fair last
week?

03:19 ✓✓

Morning Mr Ganda. I had
a meeting with Mr
Jabulani Radebe SSA
Liaison Officer yesterday
and he requested more
time to engage his
Manager and DG.

20:29

07 Jan 2024

Good evening Mr Sewele
and complements of the
New Year.

07:04 ✓✓

Cpt Sewele Gqabi's-
InvestgnJune21 turned on
disappearing messages. New



SL

SS

23:36

95%

< 54



Cpt Sewel...



SG5

11 Jul 2024

Good morning Mr Ganda.
Our office is still waiting
for DIRCO to respond
regarding the MLA
forwarded to Zimbabwe. I
personally forwarded an
email to Mr Ravhudzuli
who works for SA
Embassy in Zimbabwe to
request a progress and
he referred me back to
DIRCO SA. I am trying to
call Martha Sethokga of
DIRCO SA to check if she
has received feedback.
We are also waiting for
feedback from Mr
Ramokhele regarding the
meeting he promised to
facilitate between our
office and DG SSA.

17:18



You deleted this message.



SS

SS

17

Kevin Woods book notes

THE KEVIN WOODS STORY: IN THE SHADOW OF MUGABE'S GALLOWS. (2007)

SG6

Joined British SA police on 5th November 1979

Met Alan 'grumpy' Trowsdale, in charge of Matobo, police station in national park south of Bulawayo. Second in charge Brian Hayes.

Alan subsequently became his SA handler many years later when he was heading up Mugabe's CIO in Matabeleland, as he had moved to S

A Military Intelligence. "I helped him out with information regarding the activity of the ANC and its guerrillas in Zimbabwe. It didn't take too much convincing by Alan and Gray 'KD' Branfield for me to become one of their clandestine agents in Zimbabwe.

As a CIO member, Special Branch officer in plain clothes as officer in charge of the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) in Bulawayo he "ran many sources of information for the SA military. I already knew the ropes"

From Matobo he served a year or two in Bulawayo's high-density suburbs and played some rugby for the police where "I rubbed shoulders with Gray Branfield and 'RAT' (later also to become a spy). He moved on then to Mzilikazi in Bulawayo and then to Bulawayo Central and on to Support Unit, the BSAP's paramilitary arm. He left Support Unit in 1979 and went on to the Bulawayo Crime Prevention Unit, leaving there in 1980 after he had been appointed officer in charge of Bulawayo Central police station to join the CIO.

From time of promotion to section officer in 1974 had daily access to sitreps and could follow progress of the war throughout Rhodesia. Was directly involved in the way be it on SB or ground coverage, attachment to Police and Anti Terrorist Unit patrols, Support Unit counter-insurgency operations, Riot Squad duties in Bulawayo, SWAT - never far from terrorist activity in the city centres and surrounding suburbs.

Frantised with SAS, Selous Scouts, Rhodesian Light Infantry, air force and so on...

Late in 1974 attached to SB. Then promoted to section officer. A couple of days training at Red Bricks, the SB HQ in Salisbury.

Then deployed to Mount Darwin, in the Operation Hurricane area NE of Salisbury. Has a brother Mike.

Chilobi, and Mike Bullen, part of snooker team with Kevin.

In 1977 he transferred to Support Unit, the military arm of the BSAP where he became a company commander of Charlie Company. The war was really hotting up and he felt he had a greater chance of seeing action in the BSAP's front line. Worked closely with the Rhodesian African Rifles and their operations. and the RLI. Fireforces were wholly dependent on helicopters and other military 'luxuries'.

His Support Unit reported to Fred Mason.

Fellow company commander Tony Dawson

Woods is promoted officer in charge Bulawayo.

SLI

April 18 1980 Robert Gabriel Mugabe sworn in as PM.
Now Rhodesian pilots sided with ZANLA in their fight against ZIPRA fighters.

1982 joined CIO

The Central Intelligence Organisation was born out of a replacement of the FISB, the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The FISB comprised a loosely knit security organisation working in the Federation but had become defunct with the independence of Malawi (formerly Nyasaland) in 1963.

Winston Field replaced Sir Edgar Whitehead and in January 1964 the CIO was born. The new department would fall under Prime Minister's office and was known as The Department of the Prime Minister with its own unaudited budget. The then BSAP Deputy Commissioner Ken Flower was tasked by Field to get the CIO up and running and remained its head until a few months after independence in 1980.

The Rhodesian BSAP Special Branch formed the nexus of the CIO but remained within the BSAP at regional and district police station level. The BSAP Special Branch was responsible for internal security while CIO, which had access to all Special Branch material, dealt with safeguarding national security and co-ordinating all intelligence acquired from internal, external and other source.

The CIO consisted of a number of branches. Branch 1 (Internal) was in essence the BSAP Special Branch. When I transferred from the BSAP to the CIO, was attached to Branch 1 (Internal)

The other branches dealt with external operations, military intelligence, telecommunication and the close security of government officials.

Throughout the Rhodesian war the Special Branch operated throughout the country, usually in close support of other armed forces, including the Support Unit, the SAS and the Selous Scouts.

After independence and subsequent to the addition of thousands of appointees from the liberation movements, the majority of whom were untrained and mainly from Mugabe's ZANU PF, the CIO slowly but surely mutated into the government's strongest right arm and operated with general impunity.

In the Central Intelligence Organisation we infiltrated every facet of civilian life. I had sources of information everywhere, from waiter listening to bar gossip and Bulawayo clubs, bars and night spots to spying in its factories and commercial areas. Everything was intelligence and needed to be documented. The CIO had an enormous computerised library and almost everyone who lived in Bulawayo is in there somewhere. The Whites thought he was a traitor working for Mugabe.

The CIO had information of South African military assistance to the dissidents in Matabeleland. Interrogation of Hilary Nkomo was gave details of supply missions from SA for use by former ZAPU terrorists in Matabeleland. SA gave former Zipra guerrillas RPG rocket launchers and rockets, 60mm mortars, RPD machine guns with thousands of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of hand grenades.

Russians decided to exhibit at the 1983 Trade Fair.

CIO bugged entire second floor at Bulawayo Holiday Inn where Russians stayed.

The attack on ZANU PF HQ in Manica Road, Harare in 1981 was always seen as suspect at CIO HQ. Woods suggests here it was an inside job.

Mugabe's cousin Albert was appointed ZCTU president. Albert was an independent thinker. He was found dead, fully clothed in his swimming pool.

Sydney Malunga was a ZAPU member of Mugabe's coalition government, In 1982 he was accused of associating with the then ex-ZIPRA fighters in Matabeleland and also with dissidents. He died when his Mercedes was hit head on by an armoured military vehicle on Glenville Drive just outside Bulawayo.

In 1985 Eric Roberts a detective superintendent in CID in Bulawayo. The .32 slugs that killed him showed lands and grooves which no one had seen before. Roberts had recently been involved in arresting a couple of SA Military Intel liaison officers at Beitbridge who used to visit the pubs in the border town of Messina in their office on the South African side. The destruction of Zimbabwe's air force at Gweru's Thornhill air base also produced no successful prosecutions though the regime arrested and brutally tortured some white air force officers into confessions Woods has no doubt that this was SA MI op and was part of SA police of destabilisation of the Frontline States. But exactly which branch of the MI and who if any agents inside were used . Woods says 'KD' has admitted complicity in this attack, "but not to me."

He sets the scene: Mugabe and his ZANU PF government; Mugabe and his Fifth Brigade killers; Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU; Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU dissidents; SA MI and their Super ZAPU dissidents; the white-Zim farmers; the Matele people; the Frontline States and the CIO.

Fifth Brigade went out into Matabeleland without N Korean officers. Head of Fifth Brigade said that he expected his troops to deal with dissidents and I don't expect any report back. They called themselves Mugabe's army.

Dominic Chinenge, head of Zim Armed forces, changed his name to Constantine Chiwenga.

CIO Director of Political Affairs, Edison Shiriuru. Security Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa – rumoured to be Mugabe's personal banker and financial advisor.

Under orders from Minister Herbert Ushewokunze, the Fifth Brigade searched for Nkomo (he had tried to flee the country but he had been stopped at the airport and his passport forfeited). When the Fifth found his house, Nkomo wasn't home, so they shot his chauffeur. PIO outlined that the order had come from the Minister of State Security, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Nkomo fled to Botswana. Tiny Rowland, head of mining giant Lonrho in the UK arranged an aircraft to take him to Johannesburg where he caught a British Airways flight to the UK.

Nkomo's Zipra shot down two civilian aircraft using ground to air missiles. The first Viscount named Hunyani on 3rd September 1978 by his ZIPRA fighters sought out the wreckage of the aircraft and raped and butchered the survivors as they lay injured and suffering on the ground (evidence?) The second Viscount was shot down near the same place using a Soviet heat seeking SAM-7 missile.

When Super ZAPU killed commercial farmers Woods would get messages back to SA (he checked the shell casings and identify who had done the killings). The SA commanders in SA would recall the Super ZAPU fighters and pull them into line. The weapons could be identified by the shell casings, and the fighters who used them. Woods says once identified those weapons were never used again in the killings.

SLI

SS

Casings had the 22/80 stamp on the base. "super Zapu had a full ballistic database on the weapons they had issued to their dissidents, so it was quite easy for them to identify who had issued the weapons used in the murder I was referring to."

Mnangagwa was jailed for terrorism in Rhodesia, became security minister.

Dumiso Dabengwa in prison in Chikurubi for four years even after a trial court found insufficient evidence against him regarding the catching of huge amounts of war material near the former ZAPU assembly points in Matabeleland soon after the ceasefire and general election in 1980. Dabengwa as ZAPU military intelligence chief, Lookout Masuku as their army commander and Joshua Nkomo as the party leader have sworn under oath and have denied ever giving the orders for the ZIPRA guerrillas to cache the majority of the war material they held in their assembly points, and only hand in old weaponry at the ceasefire.

But the orders for the arms cache did in fact come from these three men who wanted to create a federal state of Matabeleland.

The reader should understand that as a security organisation the CIO had thoroughly infiltrated Joshua Nkomo's political movement, ZAPU. "We listened to his telephones, opened his mail, and monitored his movements and that of Dabengwa and Masuku, even while they were senior members of the government and military.

They had spies at the assembly points. Interrogation of ZIPRA fighters and deserters from the army revealed the truth about the arms cache.

It would have been impossible for anyone to covertly plant the huge caches – some of them less than a hundred metres from an assembling point holding around 3,000 armed ZIPRA combatants.

Dabengwa was awarded the Home Affairs ministry by Mugabe as part of the Unity Accord. Woods discovered one of the enormous ZIPRA cache of weapons at Filabusi, some 100 kilometres east of Bulawayo – a cache that was constructed on orders from ZAPU members or the ZIPRA occupants of the assembly point at Silalbuchwa.

In late 1983 SA MI initiated a program which saw them infiltrating into Matabeleland South over a period of about two years a number of their own trained and equipped terrorists. Operation part of SA destabilization program in Zimbabwe and code named Operation Drama. Funded by MI. On the ground administration control and logistical operation were responsibility of Colonel Mac, a former CIO officer from Zimbabwe who was later gazetted by Zimbabwe government an awarded the dubious distinction of being declared an 'enemy of the state, as was **Gray Branfield** who was attached to another department of MI in SA. In reality there were never more than 60 Super ZAPU dissidents trained at Entabeni camp near Messina in SA, subsequently operating in Matabeleland.

SA policy of simultaneously destabilising Zimbabwe by covert military means, while at the same time blaming ZAPU whenever possible for the activity of its own dissidents, went a long way in causing the irrevocable breakdown between Mugabe and Nkomo.

The whole concept of Super ZAPU was aimed at further destabilising Zimbabwe as a whole, and also to cause great confusion between the different military forces on the ground in Matabeleland South. An unstable Zimbabwe would affect the ability of ANC guerrillas in their operations across the Limpopo was the thinking behind the idea. The more unstable

Shi

SS

21

Zimbabwe was the less effective the ANC guerrillas would be in spring-boarding their attacks from Zimbabwe, or so the SA MI thought.

After establishing the existence of Super Zanu in Matebeleland, Woods set up a program to destroy it from within.

Woods admits he had been a SA government double agent for some years as part of their Operation Barnacle, which consisted of four of us ex-army and police 'okes' in Zimbabwe. Essentially our brief was to attack ANC guerrilla targets in Zimbabwe on intelligence that I supplied and to make it difficult for them to operate across the Limpopo River into SA.

Recruited as a double agent by Grumpy and Gray Branfield. They approached Woods in 1982 soon after he joined the CIO. Woods had known them for many years in the BSAP and they were now working for SA military intelligence. They needed info on activities in Zim of MK and Woods had access to that information. It was easy for them to request assistance because they had been "friends for a long time". It started off with snippets of info here and there and then developed into a full blown double agent.

Got access in CIO to double lined bright red Top Secret documents. Briefed Mugabe on situation in Matebeleland.

Of particular interest to the SA government was his access to document intelligence and "my involvement with the ANC and the CIO desk that dealt with them in Bulawayo"

You had SA apartheid government with the ANC trying to overthrow that government, and Zimbabwe actively supporting ANC guerrillas who would cross into SA carry out violent military missions and then return to Zimbabwe.

The CIO working with Woods daily CIO operatives liaised with and attended to ANC guerrillas in Zimbabwe.

Woods says ANC refugees were treated differently from ANC fighters. They were watched closely by the CIO and through him by the SA MI. In early 1982 Mugabe ordered tough surveillance and a general tightening up on ANC guerrillas in Zimbabwe. This was done by him to avoid reprisals by the SA military.

Says Mugabe would "afford ANC fighters refuge at his peril" Frontline states were hammered time and again by SA Defence Forces for their policy of supporting the liberation movements.

"We in the CIO kept a close eye on the ANC guerrillas and I told SA MI all about it. In early 1982 Mugabe ordered tough surveillance and a general tightening up on ANC guerrillas in Zimbabwe. This was done by him to avoid reprisals by the SA military"

Picked up ANC fighters by CIO in Bulawayo. They revealed arms caches that had been hidden in the Beitbridge area. These ANC guerrillas would normally travel to Beitbridge using civilian transport and recover what weapons they needed, cross into SA, carry out the op, return to deposit whatever they had left in the cache and return to Bulawayo.

These caches, consisted mainly of AK rifles and ammunition, TMH antitank landmines and blocks of TNT explosives, were recovered by CIO and the fighters returned to Zambia by dropping them off across the Zambezi, using CIO motor launches that the CIO had moored at Victoria Falls and Kariba.. Woods says the decision to frustrate the ANC was a "smokescreen" - he still helped the ANC. Woods says he told the SA that fact.

SLC

Woods says he had access to every top-secret piece of intelligence about Zimbabwe's economy and industrial and commercial assets. Dams electricity grids etc. he was in charge of Mugabe's close security.

Prior to one of President Mugabe's visits to the Trade Fair (Zimbabwe International Trade Fair) in Bulawayo. "I was asked by KD (Major Gray Branfield, South African Military Intelligence chief in charge of Operation Barnacle – killed in Iraq in 2006) to draw up a plan for Mugabe's assassination. I declined..pure and simple. Maybe KD was making preparations for an operation to head coming up on his own initiative, or perhaps he had been given the directive by his bosses, I just don't know. (IS HE KIDDING, KNOCK OFF HEAD OF STATE AS A FREELANCE!!)

Woods now states the SA was angry that he declined to be involved in the assassination. He was told they went ahead with the plans to kill the Prez at the 1984 Trade fair. It would be a wet job at Bulawayo State House. Woods says he was told by sADF General Kat Liebenberg at a military intelligence braai at their Magaliesberg farm, PW Botha had flatly refused any operation to kill Mugabe. He cites former SA foreign minister Pik Botha as telling the TRC that Dr Neil Barnard or one of the security reported that elements in Rhodesia were endeavouring to kill Mugabe.

Woods cites bombings in Gaborone, Lusaka and Harare. PW wagged his finger at international press and told Frontline states in relation to raids on their capital they were first installment.

Liebenberg said Operation Leo, was in response to recent attacks on Sasol 2 near Secunda in Eastern Transvaal. The targets had been an operational transit facility in Gaborone, an ANC office and house in Harare and ANC targets just outside Lusaka, all of which were bombed by the SA Airforce.

Defence minister Magnus Malan made SA policy clear on February 4, 1986. "The security forces will hamper them. We will not sit here with hands folded waiting for them to cross the borders. We will settle the hash of these terrorists, their fellow travellers and those who help them before they enter our territory."

Coincidentally, among the Harare facilities attacked was a residence in Ashdown Park where the ANC chief representative for Zimbabwe, Joe Gqabi had been assassinated in 1981 by a South African military intelligence special operations team led by KD.

"I recall some pub talk between us crazy people from these shadowy sections of the forces, where KD complained about the 9mm Uzi sub-machine gun he had been issued with to shoot Joe Gqabi. His whinge was that the bullets had been reduced to such a slow speed that they barely penetrated the driver's window, never mind killing the target."

Woods said Gqabi survived an attempted car bomb six months earlier when a charge placed under his car failed to detonate as he reversed over the triggering device. Gqabi was killed in the driveway of his Ashdown Park home on the evening of Friday 31st July 1981, just as he arrived in his Zimbabwean-registered vehicle. Police said they recovered 19 spent 9mm cartridge cases.

SS

SS

Three teams from SA MI had been deployed to Harare to carry out the assassination (HOW DOES HE KNOW THIS?) and they were assisted by sources in CIO Harare, with Gqabi's movements, his vehicle registration numbers and different places he slept at night.

Pik wrote to Woods on 27 May 1995 "it is a source of great regret that you should have to bear this pain and suffering on account of official activities launched for official reasons" - despite denials he knew anything about his activities while he was Foreign Minister.

South African State Security Council – FW and Pik both said it was not told about cross border killings in most cases.

After the car bombing which killed several ANC Woods said he was told time and again by KD that senior sources in Harare CIO and told him he would know if he was in the shit.

Questioned by Nigel Kudzurunga about a Textell, smuggled into Zimbabwe by Stompie (Rory). Investigating officer Bet Chief Inspector Bernard Jambawu.

Mentions arresting in early 1980s of two white CIO officers Philip Hartlebury and Colin Evans from CIO hq who had been arrested for spying for SA. After a couple of years they had been released and deported.

Earlier in the 1980s Woods said that KD and some of his group, together with some of our lot, had carried out a spectacular jail-break in Harare.

In 1981 the South African military had destroyed the Zimbabwe National Army's main armoury and heavy ammunition storage facility at Inkomo Barracks just outside Harare. In the subsequent police and CIO investigation of the sabotage, a ZNA captain – and so it seems a SA military agent, Patrick Gericke, were arrested, tortured and detained at Harare Central police station. A Zimbabwean Republic police detective Inspector Varkevisser was the investigating officer. On instructions from his bosses in the SA MI, KD planned an operation to free Gericke, who was in the cells at Harare Central police station. It involved the SA Air force and military people. Under the law he should have already been moved to prison, but he hadn't. KD's escape operation involved capturing Varkevisser, putting a belt containing explosives around his waist with a locked detonator on it. Only after he freed Gericke from prison would he be given the key. They took him to a pre arranged rendezvous where KD and company drove them to an aircraft and they flew to SA. Gericke took a SADF job.

Woods smuggled letters out to KD and grumpy.

President Botha had negotiated for the release of two other CIO/SA operatives. Phillip Hartlebury and Colin Evans. They had been arrested a few years earlier on suspicion of involvement with the Joe Gqabi assassination and the bombing of Mugabe's HQ in Manica Road Harare.

Mugabe's HQ in Harare had been blown up on 18th December 1981. SA government has never admitted complicity in this attack.

SLI
SS

In our case president Botha did agree to an extraction plan for us, on condition that his military commanders ensured that the operation could be completely denied and no security force member, or equipment traceable to the SADF was used.. Pik is still insistent that anti-ANC operation in Zimbabwe was not sanctioned by the SA govt. as woods points out: why try to release us then?

The operation to spring Woods from prison was approved under the code-name Operasie Direksie which took place a few months later, but not according to my suggestion.

Under the command of Col Joe Verster, KD and his people. A few months after Woods' move to Chikurubi Woods started receiving messages from ID, either coded letters slipped past the officer prison censor or in smuggled letters via the guards. Woods says he was told an escape attempt was going to be made by the SA government involving him and the others. All they had to do was keep as fit as possible. They were not yet convicted. In prison awaiting trial. June 30, 1988. Taken to grey Mariyah . overhead helicopter from Zimbabwe air force flown by Flt Lt Gary Kane who had been recruited by the SA to borrow one of Mugabe's Bell helicopters.

The prison van would be stopped on its way to court, they would be airlifted to a rural landing strip west of Harare where a SA Air Force Dakota was on stand-by, to take us and Kane to SA.

PW Botha had also authorised a flight of SA Air Force Mirage jets which were at that time high over Zimbabwe concentrated round Thornhill airbase in Gweru where Mugabe's Hawk fighter jet were stationed to prevent any of them taking off.

Sam and Jim led to the plan being aborted. Sam got sprung at the border with Zambia and picked up by Botswana police road block. But no one told KD there was a problem.

Among the detainees in the condemned section was a south African agent Leslie Lesiye. Leslie was a SA MI covert agent and had for some years been infiltrating the ANC. He had poisoned the old ANC militant using doctored beer or pills. He had been arrested in connection with a booby-trapped TV that had exploded in Harare in 1987. He had been given the TV by his SA handlers with instructions to deliver it to the ANC's chief representative in Maputo. Instead he disarmed it and gave it to a friend Peter Mhlope. Mhlope already had a TV so once Lesiye had left to go back to SA he gave it to a friend called Frank who took it to Harare who gave it to his wife. When she plugged it in it blew up killing her. The police traced it back to him.

South African Special Force agent Odile Harrington was also jailed at Chikurubi. She was released and deported after approaches from SA after the end of the state of emergency. She had been arrested for "trying to infiltrate the ANC in Zimbabwe"

Ronnie's brother GT had been detained at the same time and was deported to SA in 1999. He had originally been accused of complicity in the bombing in Harare of Soviet-trained ANC guerrilla Jeremy Brickhill.

Brickhill had done some of the intel on the Church Street bombing in Pretoria in May 1983 where many civilians of all races had been killed and injured. The SA State security Council, so we were told, had authorised his elimination in Harare. Ronnie and GT obtained a

SL
SS

Citroen in Harare which they fitted with explosives. It was decided to eliminate him in the Avondale shopping centre car park in Harare. On 13th October, 1987 they watched him park his car and walk off to a coffee shop owned by his brother. When he returned they detonated the bomb in the Citroen parked next to his vehicle. Brickhill was seriously injured, putting an end to his ANC activity .

While Woods was in Chikurubi, Brickhill together with Channel 4. Produced a documentary about SA hit squad and dirty tricks called The Hidden Hand.

Next in dock six months later with Barry Bawden and Mike Smith. The Judge Justice Ebrahim sentenced them to 75 years with hard labour. Forty years for the ANC office attack, 20 years for the house in Ashdown Park and 15 years for the weapons cache. On appeal the sentence was reduced to 25 years which for Woods and Smith made no difference. They were both on death row. A few months later Sam Beahan was sentenced to life for his involvement in Woods botched escape.

Marthinus van Schalkwyk, took over from FW de Klerk as head of the New National Party visited him in prison and acknowledge responsibility for him and his colleagues in prison.

Mugabe fired General Peter Walls in the late 1980s.

Judith Todd, human rights activist married to Rhodesia's last governor. Became friends with Woods. Father Fidelis Mukonori, a close friend of Mugabe's

Woods made an application to the TRC (7303/97) in mid-1997. Deputy chairman Dr Alex Boraine applied to visit Woods in Chikurubi. Mnangagwa gave Boraine the go-ahead to go to Zimbabwe. All was fine until "someone snitched" to Mugabe and the visit was cancelled. Boraine told the TRC that Woods had been prepared to testify.

END NOTE

SG

SS

26

SG7

Good afternoon

According to the information at our disposal, the following SAND Special Force members were involved in the Project "Barnacle" and "Mixer" which followed and killed MK members outside SA borders between 1980 and 1993.

1. Brigadier Gen. Geen Frits Loots.
2. Brigadier Gen. Krubert Nel.
3. General Geldenhuis.
4. Colonel Doibi Coetzee.
5. Fred Varkvisser.
6. Alec West.
7. Alan Trowsdale and
8. MacCallum.

Kindly assist this office by providing their identity numbers for investigation purposes.

 Delete ▾
  Archive
  Report ▾
  Move to ▾
  Reply
  Reply all
  Forward ▾
  ▾

Re: WHATSAPP COMMUNICATION WITH CPT SEWELA LIST OF PROJECT BARNACLE AND MIXER MEMBERS

CAUTION: External email - verify sender before opening links or attachments. Report issues to ithelp@wits.ac.za.

Some of copied correspondence with SIU police

Shadrack Kabelo Ganda

SG8

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Shadrack Kabelo Ganda** <shadrackg@gmail.com>

Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2025 at 01:59

Subject: WHATSAPP COMMUNICATION WITH CPT SEWELA LIST OF PROJECT BARNACLE AND MIXER MEMBERS

To: Shadrack Ganda <shadrackg@gmail.com>

You might note with interest the similarities in this case and the Gqabi family's: 

Imam Haron Inquest: Post-apartheid govt has failed family, lawyer argues

<http://ewn.co.za/7p0d1>

Ok I'll check it now.

Thanks

Thanks Mr Ganda. What is the name of the reporter

I think it's Max du Preez, I could be mistaken

Thanks once more Mr Ganda. We must make a follow up about the journalist. He might assist us in solving our cases.

We need to try every route and path.

Absolutely right. He is still alive

Afternoon Cpt Sewell. This is to confirm that my self and Mr Tebogo Ramokgele will meet with you at your proposed meeting on the 18/04/2023. Just give us the venue and time.

Thanks and enjoy the long weekend

<https://mg.co.za/article/1994-06-17-what-modise-didnt-know-about-ddc/>


Thanks for the information. I really appreciate it. I have requested Luthuli House to push DG State Security Agency to provide our office with the files. I am not happy the manner in which Advocate Moolala deals with this matter because he is not even taking my calls. I will keep you informed


 SS
 28



20 May 2023

Forwarded



Is there more to tell in the killing of the Imam? CASSIEM KHAN provides an analysis of the closing arguments at the reopened inquest into the killing in detention of Imam Abdullah Haron.

[https://
muslimviews.co.za/
2023/05/19/is-there-
more-to-tell-in-the-
killing-of-the-imam/](https://muslimviews.co.za/2023/05/19/is-there-more-to-tell-in-the-killing-of-the-imam/)

https://



Sh,
SS
29

23:35

G10

< 54



Cpt Sewel...




11:56

24 Jun 2023

I gather this is a new book

11:57 ✓✓

30 Jul 2023



What Modise didn't know about DDC

mg.co.za

From archives, Colin Evans name pops up again and other names of internet

<https://mg.co.za/article/1994-06-17-what-modise-didnt-know-about-ddc/>

05:15 ✓✓

12 Jan 2024



SLI
SS
30

< Back

Event Details

Edit

Col Pitsoane, Cpt Sewele, Mrs Gqabi


SG11

Protea Glen, Soweto

Friday, 26 Jan 2024

from 21:00 to 23:00

from 12:00 to 14:00 (SAST)



Calendar

● Home ↕

Alert

2 hours before ↕

Second Alert

1 day before ↕

Delete Event

SG11
SS
31